INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions is frivolous, was submitted in bad faith, and based on the unfounded argument that Defendant’s Motion for Terminating Sanctions allegedly violates California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1008 and is legally and factually frivolous in violation of CCP 128.7(b)(2) and 128.7(b)(c). Defendant’s Motion for Terminating Sanctions is not a motion to reconsider – it is a motion specifically addressing fraud upon the Court; does not violate CCP 1008; is neither legally nor factually frivolous; and does not warrant sanctions. Courts, including those in California, have the inherent authority to vacate their judgments for fraud upon the court. The decision Lynch’s motion challenged was the January 17, 2014 denial of her August 9, 2013 Motion to Vacate.
As with all of their arguments and defenses, Plaintiffs argue that Lynch’s Motion for Terminating Sanctions was filed for the improper purpose of harassment of Plaintiff and his attorneys in violation of CCP 128.7(b)(1). According to Plaintiffs, this is evidenced by: 1) the voluminous nature of the filing itself; ii) the intentional disclose of Cohen’s attorney-client privileged communication; iii) the false imputation of criminal conduct to Cohen; iv) the false imputation of criminal and unethical conduct to Cohen’s current attorneys; and v) the wholly pretextual use of the sham filing as a vehicle to continue her public campaign of harassment of Cohen as evidenced by her May 7, 2015 “press release” published on her internet blog.
Defendant’s Motion for Terminating Sanctions addressed the fact that Lynch was not served, the judgment is void due to lack of service, and confronted the excessive lies, fraud, and perjury submitted to this Court in Plaintiffs’ replies to her Motion to Vacate. “A judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction of the person where there is no proper service of process on or appearance by a party to the proceedings.” David B. v. Superior Court (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1016 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 586].
Knowledge by a defendant of an action will not satisfy the requirement of adequate service of a summons and complaint. Waller v. Weston (1899) 125 Cal. 201 [57 P. 892]; Renoir v. Redstar Corp. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1152-1153 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 603]. Because a “total absence of notice in any form cannot comport with the requirements of due process,” (In re B. G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 689 [114 Cal.Rptr. 444, 523 P.2d 244]), it has been said that a judgment of a court lacking such personal jurisdiction is a violation of due process, (Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., Marin County (1990) 495 U.S. 604, 609 [109 L.Ed.2d 631, 110 S.Ct. 2105]), and that “a default judgment entered against a defendant who was not served with a summons in the manner prescribed by statute [to establish personal jurisdiction] is void.” Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444 [29 Cal.Rptr.2d 746].
Plaintiffs ongoing fraudulent representations about service do not change the fact that Lynch was not served the summons and complaint in this matter. In their reply documents, Plaintiffs attempted to reargue their case, raised issues that may technically be viewed as fraud of an “intrinsic” nature, and forced Lynch to confront their false allegations and fraudulent representations to this Court. Plaintiffs’ argument is criminal in nature, as they have falsely alleged that Lynch “misappropriated” considerable sums from Leonard Cohen and LC Investments, LLC – who do not own the corporate assets at issue - and therefore she has every right to confront those accusations based on the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution. Leonard Cohen’s testimony, during the March 23, 2012, that Lynch never “stole from him” – just his peace of mind – is highly material and relevant given the fact that it essentially undermines his entire case against Lynch. As Plaintiffs raised this issue in their reply documents, Lynch had every right to confront and refute these false accusations. The exclusion of critical and reliable defense evidence violates Lynch’s rights to due process. See Kelley Lynch Declaration (Motion for Terminating Sanctions), Exhibit F (March 23, 2012 hearing transcript).
The right of confrontation is “one of the fundamental guarantees of life and liberty . . . long
deemed so essential for the due protection of life and liberty that it is guarded against legislative and judicial action by provisions in the Constitution of the United States and in the constitutions of most if not of all the States composing the Union.” Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55, 56 (1989), Cf. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404-05 (1965).
As to Plaintiffs’ specific arguments: i) Lynch filed the evidence necessary to confront and address the false allegations and fabricated representations in the reply documents Plaintiffs presented to this Court in response to her Motion to Vacate. It is their lies that are voluminous and required the submission of substantial evidence. Corporate documents, proving ownership interest, are neither Cohen’s property nor “salacious” in nature. (ii) Lynch did not intentionally disclose Cohen’s “attorney-client privileged communications with his former and current attorneys.” The documents are not privileged, were sent to Lynch, are evidence of her ownership interest in numerous corporate entities, and/or relate to matters reported to Internal Revenue Service and other tax authorities. Lynch was specifically excluded from attorney/client privilege. This matter is now under appeal.
Lynch has not falsely imputed criminal conduct to Cohen. Lynch’s lawyers and accountant, who worked for Internal Revenue Service, advised her that Cohen’s tax fraud was criminal. Perjury is also criminal. iv) Plaintiffs argue that Lynch has falsely alleged that Cohen’s current attorneys have engaged in criminal and unethical conduct. Lynch has addressed these matters, including their use of perjury in documents submitted to this Court by “officers of the court,” in her Motion for Terminating Sanctions. (v) Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Lynch’s Motion for Terminating Sanctions is a “wholly pretextual use of the sham filing as a vehicle to continue her public campaign of harassment of Cohen.” Leonard Cohen’s “harassment” argument is thoroughly without merit, sophomoric in nature, and absurd. It has, however, permitted Cohen and his attorneys to relentlessly malign, discredit, and target Lynch. Leonard Cohen failed to serve Lynch the summons and complaint. Lynch and her family, friends, and others have been relentlessly targeted, harassed, stalked, threatened, intimidated, and slandered over Leonard Cohen and these legal issues for years.
DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENT THAT
LYNCH’S 2015 MOTION VIOLATES CCP 1008
Lynch’s Motion for Terminating Sanctions is not a motion to reconsider and CCP 1008 is wholly
immaterial, irrelevant, and inapplicable. A motion addressing “fraud upon the court” is not a motion to reconsider. Lynch’s Motion for Terminating Sanctions asserted that the Court has the “inherent equitable power” to vacate a judgment that has been obtained through fraud on the court. The specific judgment Lynch referred to in her Motion for Terminating Sanctions was the Court’s January 17, 2014 order denying Lynch’s Motion to Vacate. Lynch did provide the Court with new evidence (Cohen’s March 23, 2012 testimony that Lynch never “stole” from him) but this was submitted for the sole purpose of proving Cohen’s use of fraud and perjury in this case.
The court in Televideo Systems, Inc. vs. Heidenthal (9th Cir. 1987) 826 F.2d 915, 917) concluded that the appellant’s “elaborate scheme involving perjury clearly qualifies as a willful deceit of the court” and noted that “it infected all of the pretrial procedures and interfered egregiously with the court’s administration of justice.” The same is true here. The Court sanctioned Heidenthal not merely to punish him, but to enable the court to proceed to hear and decide the case untainted by further interference and possible further perjury on the part of Heidenthal. All statements that Lynch was served are fraudulent as she was not.
Lynch is currently appealing the Court’s denial of her Motion for Terminating Sanctions and the Court’s position that it had no basis to vacate the January 17, 2014 order. Lynch’s Motion for Terminating Sanctions addressed fraud upon the court and sought terminating sanctions. This is not the relief sought in Lynch’s Motion to Vacate. In her Motion to Vacate Lynch argued that the May 15, 2006 judgment was void due to lack of service and the court had not obtained jurisdiction over her. The Court’s January 17, 2014 decision has not changed that fact. See Declarations of John Rutger Penick, Clea Surkhang, Palden Ronge, Paulette Brandt, and Joan Lynch (submitted with Motion for Terminating Sanctions). The limited powers of attorney, and original signature pages, have now been submitted to this Court as well.
One procedure for obtaining relief is to invoke the inherent power of a court to set aside its judgment if procured by fraud upon the court. Lynch invoked the inherent power of the court specifically with respect to its January 17, 2014 denial of her Motion to Vacate. 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985), Fraud on the court (other than fraud as to jurisdiction) is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself. The basic decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court with respect to “fraud upon the court” are Throckmorton, Hazel-Atlas, and Universal Oil Products. These cases considered the basic issues raised in cases to set aside judgments and demonstrate with Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589, 12 S.Ct. 62, 35 L.Ed. 870, the nature of the fraud and the proof required for relief. There is also a diversity of jurisdictional issues related to the May 15, 2006 Default Judgment with respect to the corporate entities – including Traditional Holdings, LLC and Blue Mist Touring Company, Inc. – inserted into the judgment.
FRAUD UPON THE COURT
The Court’s inherent power allows it to vacate its own judgment upon proof that a fraud has been perpetrated upon the court. See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246, 64 S.Ct. 997, 1001, 88 L.Ed. 1250 (1944); Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U. S. 575, 580 (1946). This “historic power of equity to set aside fraudulently begotten judgments,” Hazel-Atlas, 322 U. S., at 245, is necessary to the integrity of the courts, for “tampering with the administration of justice in [this] manner. . . involves far more than an injury to a single litigant. It is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public.” Id., at 246. Moreover, a court has the power to conduct an independent investigation in order to determine whether it has been the victim of fraud. Universal Oil, supra, at 580.
A primary aspect of the Court’s discretion is the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process. As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Roadway Express, outright dismissal of a lawsuit, which was upheld in Link, is a particularly severe sanction, yet is within the court's discretion. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980); Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U. S. 626, 370 U. S. 632 (1962) (recognizing the “well acknowledged” inherent power of a court to levy sanctions in response to abusive litigation practices).
“Tampering with the administration of justice in the manner indisputably shown here involves far more than an injury to a single litigant. It is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public, institutions in which fraud cannot complacently be tolerated consistently with the good order of society.... The public welfare demands that the agencies of public justice be not so impotent that they must always be mute and helpless victims of deception and fraud.” See Hazel-Atlas.
All in all, we find it surpassingly difficult to conceive of a more appropriate use of a court's inherent power than to protect the sanctity of the judicial process — to combat those who would dare to practice unmitigated fraud upon the court itself. To deny the existence of such power would, we think, foster the very impotency against which the Hazel-Atlas Court specifically warned. Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 862 F.2d 890 (1st Cir.1988).
This inherent power, which is based on equity, see Hazel Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., not only springs forth from courts’ traditional powers “to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the order and expeditious disposition of cases,” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., (quoting Link v. Wabash R. Co.,but also “furthers the pursuit of achieving complete justice by enabling the court to suspend those judgments whose enforcement leads to inequitable results.” Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F.3d 925, 937 (6th Cir. 1998). In Chambers, the Supreme Court observed the inherent power of federal courts includes, inter alia, the power to vacate judgments on proof that a fraud upon the court has been committed. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44, 111 S.Ct. 2123.
In Williams v. Reed, 43 Cal.App. 425 (Cal. Ct. App. 1919), it was held that the trial court has inherent power to set aside a judgment obtained through a fraud upon the court. “ It may be observed, in passing, that a court has inherent power to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court, and the right to so act or grant relief is not derived from section 473.” See also Stierlen v. Stierlen, 18 Cal.App. 609, [124 P. 226]. Miller v. Miller , 26 Cal. 2d 119, 121 [156 P.2d 931] held that “there can be no question as to the inherent power of the court to set aside the final decree if obtained by fraud.” It is a well-recognized principle that a court of general jurisdiction has the inherent power to set aside a judgment obtained through fraud practiced upon the court. See also McKeever v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 381 [259 P. 373]; McGuinness v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. 222 [237 P. 42, 45, 40 A.L.R. 1110].
To determine whether there has been fraud on the court many circuits, including the 9th Circuit, have applied Professor Moore’s definition: “Fraud upon the court” should, we believe, embrace only that species of fraud which does or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication. Gumport v. China International Trust and Inv. Corp. (In Re. Intermagnetics America, Inc.), 926 F.2d 912, 916 (9th Circ. 1911) (quoting 7 James Wm. Moore et al.); 7 J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice p 60.33, at 515 (2d ed. 1978), quoted in Alexander v. Robertson, , 424 (9th Cir.1989). Thus fraud upon the court includes both attempts to subvert the integrity of the court and fraud by an officer of the court. The distinction
between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud has been criticized by commentators, 7 J. Moore, supra p. 8, p 60.37, at 60-377 to -380; 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 2868, at 240-41 (1973), and the distinction generally does not apply to fraud upon the court, but only to fraud by the parties. 7 J. Moore, supra p. 8, p 60.37, at 60-380, p 60.33, at 60-356 to -357. The fraud in Hazel-Atlas Glass involved the introduction of fraudulent evidence, and the court did not find it necessary to distinguish between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud in setting aside the judgment. There the Supreme Court explained that the inquiry as to whether a judgment should be set aside for fraud upon the court focused not in terms of whether the alleged fraud prejudiced the opposing party but whether the alleged fraud harmed the integrity of the judicial process.
The Court in Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 736 held: “The doctrine of inherent judicial power-that is, the existence of power vested in courts by their creation, and independent of legislative grant-developed early in English common law ‘along two paths, namely,
punishment for contempt of court and of its process, and, regulating the practice of the court and preventing the abuse of its process.’ (Jacob, 23 Current Legal Problems 23, 25 (1970).) American courts embraced the doctrine as part of their common-law heritage. As early expressed by the United States Supreme Court, courts possess powers that ‘necessarily result, from the nature of their institution,’ powers that ‘cannot be dispensed with, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others.’ (U.S. v. Hudson (1812) 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34, 3 L.Ed. 259; see Meador, Inherent Judicial Authority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 Texas Law Review 1805, 1806, 1815-1816 (1995).) From their creation by article VI, section 1, of the California Constitution, California courts received broad inherent power “not confined by or dependent on statute.” (Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 267, 279 Cal.Rptr. 576, 807 P.2d 418; see also Civil Code section 22.2; Ferguson v. Keays (1971) 4 Cal.3d 649, 654-655, 94 Cal.Rptr. 398, 484 P.2d 70 [California courts possess inherent powers enjoyed by English common law courts, except for those precluded by Civ.Code, § 22.2].) This inherent power includes “fundamental inherent equity, supervisory, and administrative powers, as well as inherent power to control litigation.” (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 16, 941 P.2d 1203.) Although it has been held that California courts have inherent authority to impose evidentiary sanctions as a remedy for litigation misconduct (See Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Court (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 272, 286-291, 245 Cal.Rptr. 873), no California decision has held that a court may, when faced with pervasive litigation abuse, use its inherent judicial power to dismiss the action. We have no doubt, however, that California courts possess such power … Far from being unnecessary, the existence of inherent power to terminate litigation for deliberate and egregious misconduct-conduct which makes lesser sanctions inadequate to ensure a fair trial-is essential for the court to preserve the integrity of its proceedings. Such power does not ‘imperil the independence of the bar’ and ‘undermine the adversary system.’ (Bauguess, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 638, 150 Cal.Rptr. 461, 586 P.2d 942.) Rather, it restores balance to the adversary system when the misconduct of one party has destroyed it … When a plaintiff's deliberate and egregious misconduct in the course of the litigation
renders any sanction short of dismissal inadequate to protect the fairness of the trial, California courts necessarily have the power to preserve their integrity by dismissing the action. Without such power, the court would sacrifice its essential role of determining, in accordance with the fair application of relevant law, who should prevail in the case or controversy presented.”
California courts, as is true with federal courts, have the inherent power to vacate void judgments and to dismiss actions for abusive litigation practices. The Court elected not to use its inherent power to combat the unmitigated fraud upon the Court.
Lynch requested terminating sanctions with respect to the fraud upon the court claims. A final judgment may be set aside by a court if it has been established that extrinsic factors have prevented one party to the litigation from presenting his or her case. Olivera v. Grace (1942) 19 Cal.2d 570, 575 [122 P.2d 564, 140 A.L.R. 1328].
The Peat, Marwick Court affirmed that judges are empowered to act when a party seeks to take unfair advantage of “the integrity of the judicial system.” This decision directly addressed the fact that a court’s inherent powers include the authority to terminate a case for litigation misconduct. It is the responsibility of courts to preserve the integrity of the adversary process and the fair and efficient administration of justice.
California courts retain flexibility to exercise historic inherent authority in modern circumstances, fashioning procedures and remedies as necessary to protect litigants’ rights. See Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 830, 848, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 560; Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1377-1378, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 882.
The court in Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co. (2007) held that a trial court has inherent power to impose a terminating sanction where a plaintiff's litigation abuse and misconduct was deliberate and egregious. This is the relief Lynch requested in her Motion for Terminating Sanctions.
SANCTIONS UNDER CCP SECTION 128.7
Plaintiffs argue that CCP. 128.7(d) allows the Court to craft an appropriate sanction. Plaintiffs evidently believe an appropriate response to Lynch’s request for terminating sanctions was to retaliate against her further. The purpose of Section 128.7 is to deter frivolous filings. In Re. Marriage of Falcone & Fyke, 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 826 (Cal. Ct. App. 6th 2008). Section 128.7 provides that “a sanction imposed for violation of subdivision (b) shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of this conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.” Peake v. Underwood, 227 Cal.App.4th 426, 441 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 2014). Sanctions under CCP Section 128.7 may consist of, or include directives of nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movement of some or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation. CCP 128.7(d). The Court may also enjoin frivolous and harassing filings through its statutory authority to issue nonmonetary directives.
Plaintiffs go onto falsely accuse Lynch of obtaining Court services in bad faith. Lynch has filed one Motion to Vacate; a Motion addressing egregious fraud upon the court; and numerous responsive pleadings. At no time did Lynch obtain Court services in bad faith but the same cannot be said of Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ Complaint was meritless, filed in bad faith, and was retaliatory in nature – as is this Motion for Sanctions.
Lynch obtained an Order on Court Fee Waiver on August 9, 2013 to file papers in this case without payment of fees and costs to the Court. Plaintiffs have requested the Court to impose nonmonetary sanctions to bar Lynch from filing any further motions in this matter or to order Lynch to seek leave to file from the Supervising Judge before filing any further motions; to return Plaintiffs attorney client privileged and other confidential documents; and to enjoin Lynch’s further dissemination and publication of Plaintiffs’ privileged and confidential documents. Plaintiffs furthermore requested the Court to revoke Lynch’s Fee Waiver. Plaintiffs essentially want to bar Lynch’s access to the Court and deprive her of a multitude of constitutional rights including her right to access the court and due process. Plaintiffs also would like to obstruct justice by depriving Lynch of evidence of her corporate ownership interests.
“The right of an indigent civil litigant to proceed in forma pauperis is grounded in a common law right of access to the courts and constitutional principles of due process. ‘Restricting an indigent’s access to the courts because of his poverty . . . contravenes the fundamental notions of equality and fairness which since the earliest days of the common law have found expression in the right to proceed in forma pauperis.’” Cruz v. Superior Court (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 175, 185, quoting Isrin v. Superior Court (1965) 63 Cal.2d 153, 165. The process by which an indigent person gains access to the courts by applying for and obtaining a waiver of court fees and costs is governed by Government Code sections 68630 to 68641. See also C.S. v. W.O., B251797 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BF036276). Any decision on the part of the trial court to terminate Lynch’s fee waiver would create an unfair and unreasonable barrier between an indigent self-represented litigant and the court. Furthermore, to deny a fee waiver to an indigent litigant who is receiving government benefits is contrary to the legislative intent of the fee waiver statute.
FEE WAIVER CALIFORNIA
GOVERNMENT CODE 68636(f)
Plaintiffs argue that California Government Code Section 68636(f) applies to Lynch’s Motion for Terminating Sanctions (fraud upon the court): If the court obtains information suggesting that a litigant whose fees and costs were initially waived is obtaining court services in bad faith, or for an improper purpose such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the costs of litigation, the court may give notice that the litigant is required to appear at a court hearing to consider whether limitations should be placed on court services for which fees were initially waived.
Lynch has filed a motion addressing egregious fraud upon the court. Lynch’s motion was not without merit and most definitely not submitted to this court for the purpose of harassing Leonard Cohen or his lawyers. Lynch believes there should be a remedy for this type of egregious litigation misconduct. Lynch has every right to present arguments, including those addressing fraud upon the court, even if the Court refused to provide a necessary remedy.
Cohen’s use of Lynch’s May 7, 2015 “press release published on her internet blog” to advance his argument that Lynch’s Motion for Terminating Sanctions is a motion to reconsider, or frivolous for that matter, is absurd. The Press Release is not a legal document filed with this Court and proves nothing whatsoever. Lynch has every right to truthfully and publicly address this matter. Leonard Cohen, on the other hand, has no right to engage in slanderous, defamatory, and salacious public attacks on Lynch – which is precisely what he has done for over 10 straight years now. Lynch didn’t repeat “false accusations of criminal conduct” in her press release. Her press release addressed two credible questions: “Will IRS prosecute singer-songwriter Leonard Cohen for criminal tax fraud?” and “Was Leonard Cohen a participant in CIA’s MKULTRA program?” Lynch has asked these questions directly to IRS and CIA and feels that she has every right to inquire about these matters. Leonard Cohen has a long pattern of fabricating and embellishing stories for the news media and others. Those stories involve Phil Spector, Janis Joplin, Bay of Pigs, Yom Kippur War, and CIA’s MKULTRA program.
In United States v. Cassidy, 814 F.Supp.2d 574 (D.Md. 2011), a federal district court judge in Maryland blocked the government's use of a federal anti-stalking law to prosecute a man for posting insults and criticism of a public figure to Twitter, ruling that “the First Amendment protects speech even
when the subject or manner of expression is uncomfortable and challenges conventional religious beliefs,
political attitudes or standards of good taste.” Lynch’s Press Release is not part of her Motion for Terminating Sanctions. A blog, like a bulletin board, does not communicate except to those who voluntarily choose to read what is posted on it. Under the First Amendment “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Constitution, Amendment I. The First Amendment protects speech even when the subject or manner of expression is uncomfortable and challenges conventional religious beliefs, political attitudes or standards of good taste. See e.g., United States v. Stevens, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 1585, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). Indeed, the Supreme Court has consistently classified emotionally distressing or outrageous speech as protected, especially where that speech touches on matters of political, religious or public concern. This is because “in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide `adequate `breathing space' to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.’” See Boos v. Barry,485 U.S. 312, 322, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988) (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Faldwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988)); See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964); Snyder v. Phelps, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 1219, 179 L.Ed.2d 172 (2011) (Because the emotionally distressing “speech was at a public place on a matter of public concern, that speech is entitled to ‘special protection’ under the First Amendment. Such speech cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.”)
THE COURT HAS PROVIDED
RELIEF WHICH IT HAD NO AUTHORITY TO GRANT
Furthermore, the judgments and orders in this case are void to the extent they provide relief “which a court under no circumstances has any authority to grant.” Plaza Hollister Ltd. Partnership v. County of San Benito (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1, 20 [84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 715]; Selma Auto Mall II v. Appellate Department (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1672, 1683 [52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 599]. “No judgment of a court is due process of law, if rendered without jurisdiction in the court, or without notice to the party.” Scott v. McNeal,154 U. S. 34,154 U. S. 46.
“An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them the opportunity to present their objections. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). Failure to give notice violates “the most rudimentary demands of due process of law.” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 550 (1965). See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286, 291 (1980); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 333 (1976); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U. S. 100, 110 (1969); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 733 (1878).
FEDERAL TAX MATTERS HAVE BEEN IMPLICATED
Federal tax matters have been implicated by both the Complaint and Default Judgment. Leonard Cohen also used the Complaint and some version of the Default Judgment to file/amend tax returns; obtain fraudulent tax refunds; and defend himself with IRS Agent Luis Tejeda (head of fraud for the western division of the United States) with respect to the allegations that he committed criminal tax fraud. Lynch reported the allegations that Leonard Cohen committed criminal tax fraud to IRS on April 15, 2005 and at other times. This lawsuit, and all of Plaintiffs pleadings, are retaliation. In enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, Congress added retaliation for “providing to a law enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the commission or possible commission of any Federal offense” to the list of statutorily-defined predicate acts. See DeGuelle v. Camilli, No. 10-CV-0103, 2010 WL 1484236 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 12, 2010).
Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions is frivolous; was brought in bad faith; and is retaliatory in nature.
While actions for fraud upon the court may be rare it seems that a remedy to the fraud undermining the justice system is nearly non-existent. Accordingly, Kelley Lynch requests the Court deny Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions.
Dated: 21 August 2015 Respectfully submitted,
In Propria Persona